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ABSTRACT
"Moral Realism" is about an argument against moral realism, why it is unsound, and
what emerges from that. The argument is that if there were moral properties, they would
be queerly related to non-moral properties and this is sufficient reason to think there are
no moral properties. The argument is unsound for two reasons. The first emerges from
consideration of sensational properties like being in pain or being in ecstasy-they bear
the queer relation to non-sensational properties. The second emerges from consideration
of vice properties like being an instance of greediness-they are not queerly related to
non-moral properties. Analogies between moral and sensational properties are discussed.
A disanalogy between the moral and sensational is important to "The Explanatory
Gap" which discusses Levine's notion of an explanatory gap, relates it to the queer
relation discussed in "Moral Realism," and criticizes one use to which it is put. The
criticism emerges from consideration of the disanalogy between the moral and
sensational: our moral imagination is considerably more limited than our sensational
imagination.
That there are limits to our moral imagination is interesting. "Imaginative
Resistance" solves an old puzzle from Hume about the limits of our imaginative
capacities, for example, the inability of some people (myself, for example) to imagine
that baseless killing is morally permissible. Both the puzzle and solution illuminate the
natures of imagination and possibility and the relation between them.
Thesis Supervisor: Alex Byrne
Title: Associate Professor of Philosophy
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CHAPTER ONE
MORAL REALISM
Let moral realism (for short, realism) be the following conjunctive thesis:
MORAL REALISM-There are mind-independent moral properties and they
are actually instantiated.
This is a minimal view and different realists add different theses to it. Some add that
moral properties are non-natural properties. Some add, by contrast, that moral properties
are natural properties and also that they have causal powers. Some agree that they are
natural but deny that they have causal powers. But all realists accept that there are mind-
independent moral properties, actually instantiated.
Relatedly, all anti-realists deny that moral properties are mind-independent or
deny that there are any moral properties or deny that any are instantiated. Subjectivists
do the first. They say that there is a moral property goodness, actually instantiated but it
is mind-dependent: it is the property of being desired or being desired to be desired.
Relativists, too, say that goodness is mind-dependent: it is the property of being believed
to be good by members of a community or being held to be good by a bargain the
members made. Realists deny that goodness is like any of those properties. The realist
G.E. Moore, for example, thinks that goodness can be instantiated in a world with no
minds at all. From now on, I mean 'mind-independent moral properties' by 'moral
properties.'
Emotivists disagree with realists, relativists, and subjectivists alike. They deny
that there are any moral properties, mind-independent or otherwise. They say that there
is no rightness, for example, or wrongness or any other moral property.
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Finally, an anti-realist can disagree with emotivists, realists, relativists, and
subjectivists. He can accept that there are moral properties, so long as he denies that any
are instantiated. He can say that there is rightness; it is instantiated in some possible
worlds but not in the actual world.
All anti-realists agree, though, that it is not the case that moral properties are
actually instantiated. There is a powerful argument that they are right; the argument
follows.
1. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST REALISM
The argument starts with
(1) If any moral property is instantiated, its instantiations are determined
by the instantiation of natural properties.
The instantiation of a property x is determined by the instantiation of a property y just in
case the instantiation of y suffices for the instantiation of x and this is true across all
possible worlds, not just the actual world. If things instantiate moral properties then, in
the sense just given, their instantiation is determined by the instantiation of the thing's
natural properties.
'Natural properties'? We can include, at least, all the non-moral properties.
Maybe the moral properties themselves are natural but, as noted in the introduction, that
is controversial. Being an instance of burning a cat just for fun, for example, is a natural
property. Say that Alan bums a cat just for fun (for short, Alan bums a cat). If any
action is bad, burning a cat is bad (not just bad for the cat or bad for Alan's conscience
but bad, period). If Alan's action instantiates badness-a moral property-this is
determined by its instantiating being an instance of cat burning-a natural property. This
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first premise is not controversial. Realists and anti-realists accept it; they just disagree
about whether the antecedent is true.
The next premise is
(2) For any natural property, it is an open question why things instantiating
that property instantiate a moral property, if they do.'
It is an open question why, for example, when someone burns a cat, his act is bad. It is
not an open question whether his act is bad. Everyone knows that it is. What is open is
why this bad act is a bad act.
The notion of an open question comes from G.E. Moore although Moore says
very little about what an open question is. Some examples will fix ideas about it. For
instance, take the question, "Why is cat burning bad?" Take, also, a conceivable answer
to it: cat burning is bad because it hurts the cat. Someone might accept the answer-I
do-without thinking it is a perfectly satisfying explanation. The answer just produces a
new question, "Why is hurting cats bad?" Take a conceivable answer to that question:
hurting cats, and, thus, burning cats, is bad because cats don't like it. Someone might
accept that answer while still thinking it too is a less than perfectly satisfying
explanation. He might wonder, "Why is doing something that cats don't like bad?" A
trail of why-questions has been opened up and it is hard to see where (or if) it stops.
Each answer to each question in the series seems to raise a question analogous to the first.
Whatever a perfectly satisfying explanation turns out to be, I assume that it is a necessary
condition on being one that it blocks the trail of 'why's.
To say that it is an open question why cat burning is bad is to say that there is no
such perfectly satisfying explanation of why it is bad. The claim that it is an open
1 If moral properties are natural properties, then this premise should begin: 'for any non-moral natural
property.'
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question why cat burning is bad is not the claim that it seems that cat burning is not bad.
It is also not that it seems arbitrary that cat burning is bad. It is also not that any answer
to "Why is cat burning bad?" seems wrong or arbitrary. It is just that for any conceivable
answer to the question, it seems in order to ask why it is true. If we had a good
explanation for why cat burning is bad, this would not be so. This becomes clear from
considering cases where there is no open question.
Take a square with one-foot long sides. It is not an open question why something
instantiating the property of having four one-foot long sides and four right angles
instantiates the property of being a square. That it does is guaranteed by the meaning of
'square.' The trail of why-questions is blocked once you know the meaning of the word.
So someone who says, "I wonder why squares have four sides" does not know the
meaning of 'square.' Someone who wonders why cat burning is bad might perfectly well
know what 'bad' (and 'cat burning') mean. When you teach someone what 'bad' means
(or 'cat burning'), you do not thereby teach them why cat burning is bad. When you
teach them what 'square' means, you do teach them why the thing with four one-foot
long sides and four right angles is a square.
By further contrast with the moral case, consider a small glass full of water. It is
not an open question why things instantiating the property of being a small glass full of
H20 instantiate the property of being full of water. Unlike "Why are things with four one
foot sides and four right angles squares?," though, "Why is a small glass of water a glass
of H20?" is not answerable by just anyone who understands the meaning of its words (I
cannot answer it, for example). You can only answer it by learning some chemistry.
Learning the requisite chemistry blocks the trail of why-questions. Someone who
8
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wonders why a small glass of water is a glass of H2 0 is ignorant of chemistry. Someone
who wonders why cat burning is bad is ignorant of what, exactly? Ethics tells you that
cat burning is bad, but for any reason it gives as to why it is bad-it hurts, cats do not like
it-you can ask why it is true. After all, Moore might well accept that there is an open
question about why cat burning is bad even though Principia Ethica contains a lot of
ethical theory.
The water case brings out a respect in which my notion of an open question
differs from Moore. Moore holds that there is an open question about whether an act that
is desired to be desired is a good act and this is shown by the fact that a priori it makes
perfect sense to wonder whether something that is desired to be desired is good. By
contrast, Moore argues, a priori it makes no sense to wonder whether something good is
good. I drop the restriction to what makes a priori sense. It is not just that you can
wonder a priori why cat burning is bad. You can wonder a priori why a small glass of
H2 0 is a glass of water. But, unlike in the water case, you do not stop wondering why cat
burning is bad after learning lots of ethics or chemistry or whatever.
There is, then, a case for the thesis that it is an open question why acts
instantiating being an instance of cat burning are bad. Some realists will deny the thesis,2
but I think there is something to it. At least, there is a contrast between "Why is cat
burning bad?" and both "Why is something with four one-foot long sides and four right
angles a square?" and "Why are small glasses of H20 glasses of water?" We have not
argued for the thesis that for any natural property, it is an open question why things
instantiating it also instantiate any moral property (if they do). However, in arguing for
the thesis that it is an open question why cat burnings are bad, we made no use of features
2 It is rejected in Brink (1989), Jackson and Pettit (1995), Jackson (1998), and Sturgeon (2003).
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peculiar to being an instance of a cat burning but not other natural properties. We also
made no use of features peculiar to badness but not other moral properties. So it is
plausible that we may infer
(2) For any natural property, it is an open question why things instantiating
that property instantiate a moral property, if they do.
We know from (1) that instantiations of moral properties are determined by instantiations
of natural properties. Badness is determined, for example, by being an instance of cat
burning. So it is an open question why an act instantiating being an instance of cat
burning instantiates badness even though the instantiation of the first determines the
instantiation of second. For short, the determination here is brute.
BRUTE DETERMINATION-For any property x and any property y, x is
brutely determined by y iff the instantiation of x is determined by the
instantiation of y and it is an open question why things instantiating y also
instantiate x.
From (1) and (2), then, it follows that
(3) If any moral property is instantiated, it is brutely determined by a
natural property.
For example, if cat burning is bad, its badness is brutely determined by being an instance
of cat burning.
Brute determination is pretty queer. To see in what way queer, consider again the
square with one-foot sides. This figure instantiates being a square. The instantiation here
of being a square is determined by the instantiation of having four one-foot long sides
and four right angles. It is not an open question why things instantiating the second
instantiate the first.
Consider, again, the small glass of water. It instantiates the property of being a
glass full of water. The instantiation here of being a glass full of water is determined by
10
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the instantiation of being a small glass full of H20. It is not an open question why things
instantiating the second instantiate the first.
Maybe there is just no explanation for why cat burning is bad; maybe the fact that
cat burning is bad is not the kind of fact that can be explained. Maybe-but what are the
reasons for thinking it is like that and, if it is like that, why? Why isn't it like the fact that
the figure with one-foot sides is a square or that the small glass of H20 is a glass of
water?
What the square and water examples suggest is the general, plausible principle
that if the instantiation of one property determines the instantiation of another, then the
determination is not brute. There is some explanation for why the instantiation of one
determines the other and this explanation blocks the trail of why-questions. That is,
(4) There is no brute determination.
From (4) and
(3) If any moral property is instantiated, it is brutely determined by a
natural property,
it follows that
(5) Moral properties are not actually instantiated.
This completes the powerful argument for (5). If the argument is sound, then, since
realism is the thesis that there are moral properties, actually instantiated, realism is false.3
3 (1)-(5) is quite a bit like arguments in Blackburn (1973), Blackburn (1984), Blackburn (1985), Hare
(1984), Horgan (1993), Horgan and Timmons (1992), Mackie (1977), Mackie (1980), and Mackie (1982).
How like those arguments (and how alike they are to one another), I am unsure. One clear difference is
that all of the arguments besides (1)-(5) are put in terms of supervenience not determination. The idea
behind (1)-(5) and the rest is roughly the same, though. Mackie, for example, complains that if realism is
true, then an action is bad because of its being a cat burning and it is hard to see what the force of the
'because' is. I take him to be complaining that the determination is brute. He is not complaining about
supervenience. Supervenience relates groups of properties-e.g. the moral and the natural-not particular
properties like being an instance of cat burning.
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2. WHAT IS WRONG WITH (1)-(5)
(1)-(5) is not sound because (4) is not true. If it were, no one would ever be in pain. It
will take some work to bring this out.
Let sensational properties include being in pain, being in ecstasy, being in agony,
and so on. Most people agree that the instantiation of sensational properties is
determined by the instantiation of neural properties or functional properties or behavioral
properties or... What is disputed is which do the determining. Identity theorists say,
"neural properties," functionalists, "functional properties," and so on. Let us assume that
the identity theorists are right and let us assume, further, that the instantiation of being in
pain is determined by the instantiation of having your C-fibers fire.
There is a lot to being in pain, including feeling a certain way, being disposed to
act a certain way, and being disposed to want certain things. In this way, being in pain is
like being a glass of water. There is a lot to being a glass of water, including being a
glass of liquid, being a glass of clear stuff, and being a glass of potable stuff. Being a
glass full of water is not brutely determined by being a small glass full of H2 0 because
there is no open question about why small glasses full of H20 are glasses full of water.
That is, there is no open question about why they are glasses full of liquid and full of
clear, potable stuff. With being in pain, things are different. We can assume that there is
nothing brute about why having your C-fibers fire suffices for being disposed to act a
certain way and being disposed to want certain things but that is not all that needs
The description of brute determination as queer alludes to the "The Argument From Queerness"
section of Mackie (1977). It is a badly named section since, as Mackie admits, there are at least three
arguments from queerness made in it, one of which is quite like (1)-(5). A lot more on Mackie is in my
manuscript 'The Argument From Queerness."
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explaining. Why is it that having your C-fibers fire suffices for having any feeling at all?
This is an open question. For any conceivable answer, an analogous question arises. As
Joseph Levine writes,
There seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally
'fit' the phenomenal properties of pain... [T]he connection between [being
in pain and being a C-fiber firing] is completely mysterious. (Levine
(1983): 356)
Note that what is mysterious here is not whether the instantiation of having your C-fibers
fire determines the instantiation of being in pain. We are assuming that it does. What is
mysterious is why. Levine writes, more recently,
In the case of a psychophysical [determination] claim it still seems quite
intelligible to wonder how it could be true, or what explains it, even after
the relevant physical...facts are filled in. (Levine (2001): 82; I have
replaced 'identity' with 'determination')
Again, what is intelligible is not wondering whether, for example, the instantiation of
being in pain is determined by the instantiation of having your C-fibers fire. You might
know that it is. What is intelligible is wondering why it is so determined. For any
conceivable explanation, it makes sense to wonder why it is true. Levine's view is that
being in pain is brutely determined. 4
The case for thinking it is brutely determined is at least as strong as the case for
thinking that, say, badness is. In one way, the case is even better. For example, in the
moral case, where being a cat burning brutely determines badness, it does not seem
possible that an action instantiates the first without instantiating the second. It seems that
any action instantiating the first would instantiate the second. By contrast, it seems
possible that your C-fibers are firing but you are feeling nothing at all. This is a mere
4 His terminology is that there is an explanatory gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the
fact that you are in pain. More on the explanatory gap in chapter two.
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seeming, according to Levine and identity theorists. Since being in pain just is having
your C-fibers fire, it is not possible the second is instantiated without the first.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that it seems possible. This makes the determination of
being in pain by having your C-fibers fire even more brute than the determination of
badness by being an instance of cat burning.
So if the instantiation of being in pain is determined by the instantiation of having
your C-fibers fire, we should conclude that it is brutely determined. 5 If
(4) There is no brute determination
were true, though, being in pain couldn't be brutely determined. Consider this argument,
just like a fragment of the argument against realism above:
(3*) If being in pain is actually instantiated, it is brutely determined.
(4) There is no brute determination. Thus,
(5*) Being in pain is not actually instantiated.
This is absurd--one of the premises must be false. Most people agree that being is pain
is determined by neural or functional or behavioral properties. If so, the case for thinking
it is brutely determined by neural or functional or behavioral properties is strong. (3*),
then, is very plausible. So (4) is false. But if so, not only is the above argument unsound,
so is (1)-(5) since it too includes (4).
I am not denying that brute determination is queer. If moral properties are brutely
determined, then ipso facto they are queer. But we have reason to believe that some
5 Is this because we are assuming that it is instantiations of neural properties that determine instantiations
of sensational properties? If we assume that instantiations of functional properties determine instantiations
of sensational properties does the determination no longer seem brute? I doubt it. For any functional
property, it seems perfectly sensible to ask why instantiations of it suffice for feeling any way at all. For
any functional property, it seems possible that someone instantiates it but does not feel any way and for any
functional property, it is conceivable that someone instantiates it but does not feel any way.
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actually instantiated properties are queer in just that way and this reason has nothing to
do with a belief in moral realism.
3. DISANALOGIES BETWEEN SENSATIONAL AND MORAL PROPERTIES
We started with an argument against realism, (1)-(5). It is unsound because (4) is false.
If it were true, no one would ever be in pain.
This is an extremely simple response to anti-realism. Perhaps it is oversimple.
There are, of course, many disanalogies between being in pain and badness. In general,
there are many disanalogies between sensational and moral properties. Maybe these
make a difference.
Blackburn, for example, notes that it is a priori that if moral properties are
instantiated, their instantiations are determined by the instantiation of natural properties.
By contrast, it is only knowable a posteriori that if sensational properties are instantiated,
their instantiations are determined by, say, the instantiation of neural properties.
Blackburn says that this shows that the determination of moral properties is a sort distinct
from the determination of sensational properties: it is determinationa piori (Blackburn
(1993): 145-146). 6
If so, then (1)-(5) is slightly off-track. Instead of arguing that if moral properties
are instantiated, they are brutely determined and then denying that there is brute
determination, the anti-realist might argue only that if moral properties are instantiated,
they are brutely determineda piori and then deny that there is brute determinationa priori.
6 Blackburn distinguishes sorts of supervenience not sorts of determination. However, nothing is left out
of his reply by putting it as I have.
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Sensational properties are not counterexamples to that last, weaker premise. They are not
brutely determineda pnoi.
Blackburn is right that we know a priori that if moral properties are instantiated at
all, their instantiations are determined by instantiations of natural properties and that this
marks a difference between the moral and sensational cases. We do not know a priori
that instantiations of sensational properties are determined by, say, instantiations of
neural properties. But this does not show that there are two sorts of determination. It
shows only that we know about determination in two ways. Compare: that Blackburn is
Blackburn is knowable a priori and that Blackburn is the actual author of Essays in
Quasi-Realism is only knowable a posteriori. This does not show that there are two sorts
of identity, identitya porn and identitya postiori. It shows only that some identities are
knowable a priori, some only a posteriori.
All my objection to
(4) There is no brute determination
needs is that sensational properties are brutely determined. My objection makes no claim
about how we know this.
Another disanalogy between moral and sensational properties is noted by David
Chalmers. Chalmers writes,
Moral facts are not phenomena that force themselves on us. When it
comes to the crunch, we can deny that moral facts exist at all...The same
strategy cannot be taken for [sensational] properties, whose existence is
forced upon us. (Chalmers (1996): 83; I have replaced 'phenomenal' with
'sensational')
The idea is that no matter how implausible their instantiation might be, we have no
choice but to admit that sensational properties are instantiated. Not so in the moral case.
16
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If the instantiation of moral properties is implausible enough, we can deny that they are
instantiated. Like Blackburn, then, Chalmers might claim that (1)-(5) is slightly off-
track. The crucial claim should not be that there is no brute determination but, rather,
that accepting that a property is brutely determined is a last resort. In the case of
sensational properties, we are forced to the last resort. Being in pain is forced upon us.
Not so badness. Given a choice between accepting that it is brutely determined and
denying that it is instantiated, we should deny that it is instantiated.
If that is what he is saying, then Chalmers is right that it is possible to hold that
moral properties are not instantiated. There is no disanalogy here with sensational
properties, though. It is possible to hold that sensational properties are not instantiated.
Someone who holds either thesis, it seems to me, holds a false thesis.
What needs arguing on Chalmers's behalf is that anti-realism is more plausible
than realism (where realism includes that moral properties are brutely determined).
Otherwise, accepting that moral properties are brutely determined is the last resort, not
anti-realism. Of course, Chalmers does not argue that anti-realism is more plausible than
realism. The quote comes from a book about mind, not metaethics. Lacking such
argument, though, we have no reason to think the moral and sensational cases are
importantly disanalogous.
We have reached a preliminary conclusion. (1)-(5) is unsound. Being in pain,
like goodness and badness, is brutely determined. This suffices to show that
(4) There is no brute determination
is false.
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4. GREEDINESS
There is a deeper response to the argument, namely, that not all moral properties are
brutely determined and, hence,
(2) For any natural property, it is an open question why things instantiating
that property instantiate a moral property, if they do
is false.
We earlier assumed that if badness is brutely determined, all moral properties are.
Doing so helped to make (1)-(5) as strong as possible. The assumption, however, seems
mistaken. To derive the conclusion that badness is brutely determined, we appealed to
the thesis that for any natural property, it is an open question why things instantiating that
property instantiate a moral property, if they do. The thesis does at least seem to be true
of badness (although, as noted, some realists reject it).
Is a version of it true of all moral properties? Greediness is a moral property. Is a
version of the thesis true of greediness? Say that Alan acts greedily. He and Bob work
together, get paid, and Alan takes all the money for himself. The instantiation of being
an instance of greediness here is determined by the instantiation of a natural property,
being a taking it all for yourself. Is it really an open question why actions instantiating
the second instantiate the first?
Consider someone who says, "I can see that what Alan did was a taking it all for
himself but I just don't see why doing so was acting greedily." Isn't there something
wrong with this person? He might lack the concept of greediness, in which case his
question is like, "Why is something with four equal sides and four right angles a
square?." Or he might lack information about the case. (Maybe he thinks that Bob is a
dog. People who don't share money with dogs aren't greedy.) In that case, his question
18
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is like "Why is a glass of H20 a glass of water?." Either way there is a striking difference
between his question and, say, "Why is causing pain for fun bad?"
Thus, being greedy is a moral property but not brutely determined. I guess that all
the virtue and vice properties are like that. So (2) is false. At best, only the instantiation
of badness (and maybe goodness) is brutely determined.
It should be noted that the idea that moral properties are brutely determined is a
bit surprising. Moral properties are evaluative properties. Consider some non-moral
evaluative properties: being a good pen or being a good typist or...Is it at all plausible
that instantiations of these properties are brutely determined? Take the question, "I can
see that this pen is lightweight and grippable and leak-free and...but why is it a good
pen?" Does someone who asks that question really have the concept of a pen (or really
know what a leak is or...)? If you accept that the instantiations of some moral properties
are not brutely determined and that the instantiations of some non-moral evaluative
properties are not brutely determined, you have to wonder what is so special about
goodness and badness such that they are brutely determined.
5. WHY ARE ANTI-REALISTS UNINTERESTED IN GREEDINESS?
We started with an argument against realism, (1)-(5), that proceeded from the premises
that moral properties would be brutely determined and that there is no brute
determination. We rejected the argument; it is unsound for two reasons. First, some
actually instantiated properties are brutely determined and, second, some moral properties
are not brutely determined.
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Like the first, the second response is extremely simple but it is never even
considered by the people who insist that the instantiations of moral properties are brutely
determined. I can think of three reasons for this.
First, it might be said that being greedy is not a moral property and, hence, not an
example of a non-brutely determined moral property. It might be said, in general, that
virtue and vice properties are not moral properties. Here, it is worth noting that anti-
realists tend to be consequentialists and that Moore himself is a consequentialist and a
consequentialist might insist that the only moral properties are goodness, badness,
rightness, and wrongness. I have no argument against this position but it is worth
pointing out that it is a cost of endorsing (1)-(5) that you have to deny that virtue and vice
properties are moral properties.
Second, it might be said that being greedy is brutely determined and, hence, is not
an example of a non-brutely determined moral property. It might be conceded that there
is a sense of 'being greedy' in which instantiations of it are not brutely determined. For
example, that an act is 'greedy' can be explained by appeal to the fact that it is a taking it
all for yourself but this sense of 'greedy' is non-moral. Only bad instances of taking it all
for yourself are greedy in the moral sense and since instantiations of badness are brutely
determined, so are instantiations of greediness.
This makes it seem as if badness is a part of an analysis of greediness, that
greediness is badness plus something, for example, taking it all for yourself. There is no
need to think of greediness that way. Philippa Foot's position, as I understand it, is that
acting greedily is a way of acting badly but not that badness is a part of greediness. To
20
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Foot, the relation between greediness and badness is like the relation between being
scarlet and being red.7 Redness is no part of the analysis of scarletness.
Third, it might be said that greediness is a moral property, instantiation of which
is not brutely determined, but, it might be further said, that if realism is true, goodness
and badness are instantiated. Since instantiations of goodness and badness would be
brutely determined and imperceptible, the fact that instantiations of greediness would not
be is irrelevant to the falsity of realism. It just shows that the argument needs to be
modified slightly. The thrust remains. If realism were true, goodness and badness would
be instantiated. They aren't, so it isn't.
The problem with this maneuver is seeing why realism has to include the thesis
that goodness and badness are instantiated. The minimal realist thesis is just that mind-
independent moral properties are actually instantiated. That goodness and badness are
among them is an optional extra. Some realists deny that goodness and badness are
properties at all, much less moral properties. Peter Geach and Judith Jarvis Thomson are
examples. 8
6. CONCLUSION
What has emerged is that even against a sort of realism that accepts that moral properties
are brutely determined, (1)-(5) is unsound and unsound for a simple reason. If sound, it
would show that no one is ever in pain. Since my head hurts right now, the argument is
unsound. We have seen no reason to give up this simple reason. Furthermore, it is worth
7 Cf. Foot (2000). Her position seems also to be that instantiations of goodness are determined by
instantiation of virtue properties and the determination is not brute. Since virtue properties are not brutely
determined, she thinks that goodness is not brutely determined.
8 Cf. Geach (1956) and Thomson (1997).
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stress that it is only a sort of realism that accepts that all moral properties are brutely
determined; plenty of realists deny that they all are.
Regardless, there is something attractive about (5) and, thus, something attractive
about the thesis that realism is false. These theses have wide, intuitive appeal and
showing that two arguments for them are unsound is not going to lessen it.
The appeal must come from thinking that moral properties are not the sort of thing
science investigates and then supposing it to be hard to see how they relate to those
properties science does investigate. '"There is no room," Mackie writes, "for objective
moral [properties]...in this strictly materialist universe" (Mackie (1980): 7; I have
replaced 'qualities' with 'properties').
Maybe it is hard to see where the room is. Still that isn't sufficient reason to think
there is no room. Also, 'strictly materialist' is misleading. Even before 'strict
materialism' was the scientific worldview, people thought there was no room for moral
properties. Hamlet was not endorsing strict materialism when he said that nothing is
good or bad but thinking makes it so. If there is good reason to doubt realism, it was
visible to a Danish prince who believed in souls, ghosts, and the science of the late
middle ages.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EXPLANATORY GAP
Take a world that is physically just like this one but in which no one is conscious. This is
a zombie world. In the actual world, I am pricked with a pin, I have a sensation of pain,
and flinch. In the zombie world, I am pricked with a pin and flinch. There is no
sensation.
It matters whether there could be a zombie world. If there could, there could be a
world just like this one physically but different sensationally. So sensational properties-
being in pain, being in ecstasy, being in agony, etc.-are not physical properties and
sensational states are not physical states. Analogous considerations would show that
sensational properties are not functional properties and sensational states are not
functional states.
There is a familiar, simple argument that there could be a zombie world: it is
conceivable that there is one and, hence, it is possible that there is one. Most people
think there is something wrong with the argument-it can't be that easy to show that
sensational properties are not physical properties.
Joseph Levine offers two objections to the argument. I reject the first but what is
wrong with it is interesting: it yields some constraints on a successful objection. I then
reject the second but what is wrong with it is also interesting: it shows that a certain
theory of mind is analogous to a certain metaethic.
First, more on the familiar, simple argument.
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1. THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT
We can put the argument-I call it "the zombie argument"-like this:
(C 1) It is conceivable that there is a zombie world.
(C2) If a proposition is conceivable, it is possible. Thus,
(C3) It is possible that there is a zombie world.
A proposition is conceivable just in case (i) it is possible to imagine a situation that
verifies the proposition and (ii) the imagining is clear and distinct (in a sense to be
presently explained).
Because of (i), it is insufficient for conceiving that this table is a bit to the right
that you cannot rule out that it could be. To conceive that proposition, you have to go
through the process of imagining a situation in which the table is a bit to the right. By
contrast, when I say, "It is conceivable that Nader wins the election," I have not imagined
a situation in which he does; I never have imagined such a situation. I am just voicing
my belief that I have not ruled out that it is possible or, more strongly, voicing my belief
that it is possible.
Because of (ii), it is insufficient for conceiving that this table is a bit to the right
that it seems, off the top of your head, that you can imagine a situation in which it is.
Take the proposition that Alan constructs a regular, nineteen-sided polygon with just a
ruler and compass. Off the top of my head, it seems I can imagine a situation verifying
this. On rational reflection, I cannot. Each attempt is a failure. (I take David Lewis's
word for this (Lewis (1986): 90).) Each attempt turns out to be imagining a situation in
which Alan constructs a regular, seventeen-sided polygon or in which Alan is merely
trying (failing) to construct a regular, nineteen-sided polygon or... The "clear and
distinct" clause in (ii) is meant to limit what you can conceive to those propositions
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which, on rational reflection, you can imagine being verified. This makes (C2) more
plausible than it would be without the clause.
How rational? How much reflection? These are good questions but answering
them is not important to what follows. Just rational reflection or rational reflection after
learning a lot of empirical facts? More on that later.
If it is possible to, on rational reflection, imagine a situation verifying that there is
a zombie world, then
(Cl1) It is conceivable that there is a zombie world
is true. Not everyone will accept that this is possible and much more needs to be said
about clear and distinct imagining but it is prima facie plausible that I can imagine such a
situation. Since I am interested in objections to (C2), from now on I just assume (C1).
"Possible" in
(C2) If a proposition is conceivable, it is possible
means metaphysically possible. So (C2) is quite strong for two reasons: first, because it
claims that conceivability entails possibility and, second, because the possibility in
question is metaphysical. More plausible than conceivability entailing possibility is the
weaker thesis that if a proposition is conceivable, that is good, defeasible evidence that it
is possible. We do take conceivability to be good, if defeasible, evidence for possibility.
Reading some works of fiction, you conceive their content and come to believe,
defeasibly, that things could be so. Conceiving that I am taller, I come to believe,
defeasibly, that I could be taller. It is less plausible that whatever is conceivable is
possible. For example, I seem to be able to conceive that I exist without my parents ever
existing and that proposition is impossible. Friends of (C2) deny that I can conceive this
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impossibility but because it at least seems as if I can, it is more plausible that
conceivability is merely good, defeasible evidence for possibility than that it entails
possibility.
Also, if conceivability entails any sort of possibility, it is more plausible that it
entails epistemic possibility than that it entails metaphysical possibility. A proposition is
epistemically possible just in case it is not a priori false (I take this (slightly non-
standard) terminology from Levine (1993)). It is somewhat plausible that if I can
imagine, on rational reflection, a situation verifying a proposition, then that proposition is
not a priori false. To see exactly how plausible, more must be said about rational
reflection. At any rate, the apparent counterexample to the thesis that conceivability
entails metaphysical possibility does not apply to the thesis that conceivability entails
epistemic possibility. That I exist without my parents ever existing is not a priori false,
hence, it is epistemically possible. So the fact that that proposition is conceivable-if it
is a fact-would not show that conceivability does not entail epistemic possibility. It
would only show that it does not entail metaphysical possibility.
I grant that (C2) is less plausible in both of the above ways than some alternatives.
Still, it is the premise Levine objects to and it is the premise most often used along with
(C1) to derive
(C3) It is possible that there is a zombie world.
From (C3), it follows that sensational properties are not physical properties and
sensational states are not physical states. What, if anything, is wrong with this argument?
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2. LEVINE'S FIRST OBJECTION
Levine suggests, roughly, that
(C2) If a proposition is conceivable, it is possible
is false because what is conceivable is an epistemic matter, what is possible is a
metaphysical matter, and there is no entailment from epistemic premises to a
metaphysical conclusion.9 This presentation of the objection is rough because
metaphysical conclusions follow from certain epistemic premises. From the premise that
you know you are a philosopher, it follows that you are a philosopher. This is a
metaphysical conclusion, entailed by an epistemic premise. So the no-metaphysics-from-
epistemology objection has to be precisified, the rough statement of it is false.
Levine offers the following: a proposition is conceivable just in case it is
epistemically possible. A proposition is epistemically possible just in case it is not a
priori false. Thus, a proposition is conceivable just in case it is not a priori false. For
example, that water is XYZ, not H20 is conceivable since it is not a priori false.
However, that proposition is metaphysically impossible. So some conceivable
propositions are impossible. So (C2) is false and (C1)-(C3) is unsound. 0l°
This is recognizably a precisification of the no-metaphysics-from-epistemology
objection. Levine's claim is that no conclusions about possibility follow from certain
epistemic premises, those asserting that a proposition is not a priori false.
9 "[The problem with (C1)-(C3) is its] using epistemological premises to support a metaphysical
conclusion" (Levine (1993): 124). On the previous page, he writes, "What is imaginable is an
epistemological matter and therefore, what imagining that [there is C-fiber firing without pain] does is
establish the epistemological possibility that pain is not identical to the firing of C-fibers. It takes another
argument to get from the epistemological possibility that pain is not the firing of C-fibers to its
metaphysical possibility..." (123)
10 See Levine (1993): 123. Levine gives a much more complex version of this response in Levine (2001).
The response is more complex, however, only because the version of the zombie argument is. The main
idea persists.
27
3. WHAT IS WRONG WITH LEVINE'S FIRST OBJECTION
Levine is right that there is a use of "conceivable" according to which a proposition is
conceivable just in case it is not a priori false. That sort of conceivability is not at issue
in the zombie argument, though. This emerges as follows.
I know that I could be a little taller. If Levine's objection to (C2) is sound, that I
could be a little taller is not entailed by the premise that it is conceivable that I am a little
taller. That premise should at least, I think, be evidence for the conclusion. As I
mentioned earlier, we standardly do take it to be evidence. If the objection to (C2) is
sound, though, it is not. How could it even be evidence for the proposition that I could be
a little taller that a priori I cannot tell if the proposition is false? Of course I can't tell a
priori. That just seems irrelevant to whether I could be a little taller.
Or consider this case: I am wondering what the atomic number of gold is. A
priori, it could be one, two, three,... Not only does that not entail that the atomic number
of gold could be one, two, or three, neither does it provide any evidence that one or two
or three could be the atomic number of gold. (Maybe it provides a tiny bit of evidence? I
doubt it. Say that your empirical evidence equally supports that the atomic number of
gold is two and that it is three. You are looking for a way to decide between the two. If
you find that a priori it is not false that it is two, do you increase at all the probability
that it is two? And then, finding that it is also not a priori false that the atomic number is
three, inch up its probability?)
The first problem with the objection to (C2), then, is that it is too strong. It would
show not only that conceivability does not entail possibility but, also, that it is no
28
_·L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l~~~~~~~~~~~l· ~ ~    _·
evidence for possibility in cases where it ought to be (and is assumed to be). Put aside
for a moment whether
(Cl1) It is conceivable that there is a zombie world
is evidence for
(C3) It is possible that there is a zombie world.
Regardless of whether conceivability is evidence for possibility in this controversial case,
it at least seems to be evidence in other cases. That it is conceivable that I am a little
taller seems to be evidence that I could be a little taller. Likewise, that it is conceivable
that there is a behavioral duplicate of me that is not a mental duplicate of me is evidence
that there could be such a duplicate and, hence, that behaviorism is false.
There is a second problem with Levine's objection. Consider an argument in
Naming and Necessity (Kripke (1980)) that is like (C1)-(C3). The argument is:
(K1) It seems possible that there is a zombie world. Thus,
(K2) It is possible that there is a zombie world (absent something that
defeats the seeming possibility).
Kripke then points out that he cannot think of a defeater. (He does not say there is none.)
Nevermind what Kripke thinks, let us infer
(C3) It is possible that there is a zombie world. ll
(K1)-(C3) is different from, but related to, (C1)-(C3), of course. Obviously, their
conclusions are the same. Also, one reason to think that (K1) is true is because (C1) is
true. Conceivability provides evidence for seeming possibility.
l" There are a two ways in which (K1)-(C3) differs from the argument in Kripke (1980) that I should
mention. First, (K1)-(C3) puts the argument in terms of zombie worlds; the argument in Kripke (1980) is
put in terms of zombie individuals. Second, more stress in Kripke (1980) is put on the seeming possibility
of sensational properties being instantiated without physical properties than on the seeming possibility of
physical properties being instantiated without sensational properties.
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Levine's response to (C2) cannot be modified to respond to (K1)-(C3). Levine
claims that all propositions that are not a priori false are conceivable but it is not the case
that all propositions that are not a priori false seem possible. For example, it does not
seem possible that water is XYZ. This is a problem for Levine's objection: it cannot
respond to an argument similar to (C1)-(C3) and with the same conclusion.
So there is something wrong with Levine's objection. Since its second premise-
some epistemically possible propositions are metaphysically possible-is true, his first
premise-all epistemically possible propositions are conceivable-is not. If it were true,
conceivability wouldn't even be a guide to possibility (or seeming possibility) and,
anyway, the objection only applies to (C1)-(C3), not its relative, (K1)-(C3).
Two constraints on an objection to the zombie argument have emerged. A
successful objection has to be in one way less strong than the no-metaphysics-from-
epistemology objection. It has to allow that conceivability is evidence for possibility in
humdrum cases. For example, it has to allow if it is conceivable that I am a little taller,
that is evidence that I could be a little taller.
A successful objection also has to be in one way less weak than the no-
metaphysics-from-epistemology objection. It (or a modification of it) has to respond to
(K1)-(C3).
4. THE EXPLANATORY GAP
Levine has another objection to (C1)-(C3), one which meets both constraints. A lot of
background is needed to see it.
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For simplicity, let us assume that if it is a physical property at all, then being in
pain is the property of having your C-fibers fire. If being in pain is having your C-fibers
fire, then if it is a fact that your C-fibers are firing, then it is a fact that you are in pain.
However, the fact that your C-fibers are firing seems to be something else entirely from
the fact that you are in pain. Levine thinks that there is an explanatory gap between the
two facts. When he introduced the phrase "explanatory gap," he illustrated it like this:
There seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally
'fit' the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some
other set of phenomenal properties ... [T]he identification of the qualitative
side of pain with C-fiber firing...leaves the connection between [them]
completely mysterious. (Levine (1983): 356)12
The gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and that you are in pain is an
explanatory gap because if we had an explanation for the obtaining of one in terms of the
obtaining of the other, the connection between the two facts would not be mysterious.
We have a rough definition:
EXPLANATORY GAP-There is an explanatory gap between two facts iff it
is mysterious how to explain why the (would-be) explanandum obtains in
terms of why the (would-be) explanans does. (From now on, I drop the
'would-be's.)13
12 Cf. Block (1994): "This is the famous explanatory gap. We have no conception of our physical or
functional nature that allows us to understand how it could explain our subjective experience...Francis
Crick and Christoff Koch have famously hypothesized that the neural basis of consciousness is to be found
in certain phase-locked 40 Hz neural oscillation. But how does a 40 Hz neural oscillation explain what it's
like.. .to be us? What is so special about [that] oscillation as opposed to some other physical state?" (210)
13 The use of "mysterious" suggests that the existence of an explanatory gap is relative to thinkers and
times. Nothing is mysterious simpliciter. Some things are completely mysterious to me now but will not
be later. Some things will always be mysterious to me but not to a physicist. Levine does not say whether
he thinks explanatory gaps are relative to thinkers and times. I think he should.
The attitude of some philosophers towards the explanatory gap between the fact that your C-fibers
are firing and the fact that you are in pain is that there is for all people, at present, a gap between them, but,
in the future, there will not be. The attitude of other philosophers is that for all people, now and for always,
there is a gap but for other, smarter creatures there might not be. The attitude of still other philosophers is
that there is a gap for all people at present and we just do not know if there always will be or whether there
would be such a gap for anyone.
However, for simplicity, I drop the reference to thinkers and times when talking about explanatory
gaps.
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This is rough because 'mysterious' is itself pretty mysterious. To clear up the notion of
an explanatory gap, it will help to look at some pairs of facts between which there are no
gaps.
There is no explanatory gap between the fact that something has just four equal
sides and four right angles and the fact that it is a square. That the first obtains explains
why the second does. It follows from the meaning of "square" that anything with just
four equal sides and four right angles is a square.
Likewise, there is no explanatory gap between the fact that the glass is full of H20
and the fact that it is full of water. Unlike the square case, though, the explanation is not
available a priori. A priori it is mysterious how the obtaining of the fact that the glass is
full of H2 0 explains the obtaining of the fact that it is full of water. The explanation
comes, a posteriori, from chemistry.
So Levine's claim that there is an explanatory gap between the fact that your C-
fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain is not just that it is mysterious a priori
how the explanation would go. His claim is that it is mysterious, period. No matter how
much neuroscience you know, how much psychology, etc., it is mysterious.
We can distinguish two dimensions of mysteriousness: degree and valence. There
are two degrees of mysteriousness: total and partial. Levine is clear that he thinks the gap
between the fact that there is a C-fiber firing and the fact that there is a pain is only
partial. He thinks that what needs explaining when the fact that you are in pain obtains is
complex: that you are feeling a certain way, that you are disposed to act a certain way,
and that you are disposed to desire certain things, among others. The obtaining of the
fact that your C-fibers are firing, Levine thinks, can explain the obtaining of the second
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two facts. What it cannot explain is why the fact that you are feeling a certain way ("the
qualitative side of pain") obtains.
An attempt to explain why the fact that you are hurting obtains in terms of the
obtaining of the fact that your C-fibers are firing, Thomas Nagel writes, would be like a
pre-Socratic trying to explain the obtaining of the fact that something is matter in terms
of the obtaining of the fact that it is energy (Nagel (1979): 177). In the pre-Socratic case,
however, unlike in the pain/C-fiber case, the mysteriousness is total. Nothing about the
obtaining of the fact that something is matter can be explained by the pre-Socratic in
terms of the obtaining of the fact that it is energy.
Another dimension of mysteriousness is its valence. We can distinguish three
sorts. When the explanandum and explanans seem to oppose one another, this makes it
mysterious how the obtaining of one is to be explained in terms of the obtaining of the
other. The facts (seem to) have opposed valences. For example, consider an early
modem view of the relation between the fact that something is extended and the fact that
it is colored. According to it, the obtaining of the first explains why the second does not
obtain.14 Presented with the contemporary physicalist view that colors are surface
properties of bodies, the early modem would be as mystified as the pre-Socratic-the
mystery would be total. The reason he would be mystified, though, is that he has a theory
according to which the fact that something is extended entails that it is not colored. He
thinks the fact that something is extended opposes the fact that it is colored.
In the pre-Socratic case, the fact that something is energy and the fact that
something is matter do not seem to oppose each other, they seem indifferent to each
14 Richard Price writes, "A coloured body, if we speak accurately, is the same absurdity with a square
sound. We need no experiments to prove that...colours...are not real qualities of bodies; because the ideas
of matter and of [colours] are incompatible." (Price (1969): 680-681)
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other. The facts have neutral valences. When the explanans and explanandum seem
indifferent to each other, this makes it mysterious how the obtaining of one is to be
explained in terms of the other.
Finally, it is possible to have an explanatory gap between two facts even when
their valences are attractive. This can happen when the explanans seems to support the
explanandum but only partially. In a case like this, it is mysterious how the obtaining of
one is to be explained in terms of the obtaining of the other-something seems left out.
This is Levine's position: the fact that your C-fibers are firing partially supports the fact
that you are in pain-that is why the mystery is not total-but the support is only partial
since the feel of pain is unexplained.
Summing up, there is an explanatory gap between two facts just in case it is
mysterious how to explain the obtaining of the explanandum in terms of the obtaining of
the explanans. We have distinguished two dimensions of mysteriousness. Some
mysteries are total, some partial. Some mysteries arise because the two facts seem
opposed to each other, some because the facts seem indifferent to each other, and others
because the facts seem supportive but only partially. Levine's position is that there is an
explanatory gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in
pain. The mystery is partial and it arises because the facts seem only partially supportive.
5. LEVINE'S SECOND OBJECTION
The existence of explanatory gaps is not surprising and the world is full of them. There is
an explanatory gap between the fact that someone is Joseph Levine and the fact that my
car is a Chevy. It is mysterious how to explain why the second obtains in terms of why
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the first does. All that shows is that the fact that someone is Levine is a bad choice of
explanans for the fact that my car is a Chevy. To explain why the fact that my car is a
Chevy obtains, you are better off appealing to the fact that it came from a certain factory
and was built out of certain materials and according to certain specifications.
Levine claims that if there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is
conceivable that one obtains without the other, in particular, it is conceivable that the
explanans obtains without the explanandum. In "Materialism and Qualia," for example,
he writes,
If there is nothing we can determine about C-fiber firing that explains why
it has the qualitative character it does...it immediately becomes
imaginable that there be C-fiber firings without the feeling of pain, and
vice versa. (Levine (1983): 357-358; Levine uses 'conceive' and
'imagine' interchangeably)
And in "On Leaving Out What It's Like," he writes,
It is because the qualitative character is itself left unexplained by the
physicalist...theory that it remains conceivable that a creature should
occupy the relevant physical...state and yet not experience qualitative
character. (Levine (1993): 129)
Since there is a gap between the fact that someone is Levine and the fact that my car is a
Chevy, it is conceivable that someone is Levine and it is not the case that my car is a
Chevy. There is a gap, Levine thinks, between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and
the fact that you are in pain, so it is conceivable that your C-fibers are firing but you are
not in pain. Levine thinks, further, that there is an explanatory gap between any physical
fact and any sensational fact. Thus, he thinks that
(Cl1) It is conceivable that there is a zombie world
is true.
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Levine also thinks that there can be an explanatory gap between two facts even
though that one obtains implies that the other does. What is explicable, he thinks, is one
thing, what implies what is something else entirely.
Take the gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you
are in pain. Say that C-fiber firing is pain and, thus, that your C-fibers are firing implies
that you are in pain. This does not close the explanatory gap. However, it makes the
gap-unlike the gap between the fact that someone is Levine and the fact that my car is a
Chevy-surprising. Of course there is an explanatory gap between the fact that someone
is Levine and the fact that my car is a Chevy-those facts have nothing to do with each
other. Levine thinks there can be gaps between facts that have an awful lot to do with
each other. There can be objectionable explanatory gaps.
OBJECTIONABLE EXPLANATORY GAP-There is an objectionable
explanatory gap between two facts iff there is an explanatory gap between
them and that the explanans obtains implies that the explanandum
does. 15 ,16
15 There is an objectionable explanatory gap between the fact that water is H20 and the fact that twice two
is four. There is no explaining why the second obtains in terms of why the first obtains but since both facts
obtain in all possible worlds, each implies the other. From now on, I ignore objectionable explanatory gaps
between facts that obtain in all possible worlds.
16 Levine's most famous thesis is that there is an objectionable explanatory gap between the fact that your
C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain. As a result, he thinks that even if you know that when
one obtains, the other does, it makes sense to wonder why this is so.
More controversially, Levine's view is that even if pain is C-fiber firing, there can be an
explanatory gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain. Some deny
this. They say that if pain is C-fiber firing, it is about as sensible to wonder why the obtaining of the fact
that someone's C-fibers are firing explains the obtaining of the fact that he is in pain as it is to wonder why
the obtaining of the fact that someone is Levine explains the obtaining of the fact that he is Levine.
(Papineau (1996), for example, puts the objection clearly.)
Admittedly, there is no explanatory gap between the fact that someone is Levine and the fact that
someone is Levine. That is insufficient to show that there is no explanatory gap between the fact that your
C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain. That Levine is Levine is knowable a priori does not
show that the identity of pain and C-fiber firing is or the identity of water and H20.
The case of water and H2 0 is instructive. As long as you don't know any chemistry, it can make
good sense to wonder why the fact that something is a glass full of H20 explains why it is a glass full of
water. Further, we can give a perfectly good explanation.
We have a spectrum of cases here. There is no explanatory gap between the fact that someone is
Levine and the fact that someone is Levine. There is just no explanation to be offered here. There is also
no explanatory gap between the fact that there is a glass full of H2 0 and the fact that there is a glass full of
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We now have an argument against
(C2) If a proposition is conceivable, it is possible.
We saw above that Levine commits himself to
(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that
the explanans obtains without the explanandum.
Take two facts between which there is a gap.
(L2) There is an explanatory gap between x (explanans) and y
(explanandum).
From (L1) and (L2), a preliminary conclusion follows,
(L3) That x obtains and y does not is conceivable.
Levine thinks that objectionable explanatory gaps are possible. So we are free to
stipulate that the gap between x and y is objectionable.
(L4) The gap between x and y is objectionable.
So that x obtains and y does not is impossible. From (L3) and (L4), it follows that
(L5) That x obtains and y does not is conceivable and impossible.
From which follows a final conclusion,
(L6) (C2) is false.
Levine never explicitly offers (L1)-(L6). His explicit objections to (C1)-(C3) are all
versions of the no-metaphysics-from-epistemology objection. He holds the crucial
premises of (L1)-(L6), though, so I assume he would endorse the argument.
There is a lot to like about it. Unlike the no-metaphysics-from-epistemology
objection, it is not too strong. It allows that the conceivability of a proposition is
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water but this is not because there is no explanation to be offered. Rather, it is because we have a good
explanation. That is just what is missing in the mental case and why there is an explanatory gap between
the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain.
evidence for its possibility. For all it says, conceivability entails possibility except in
cases involving objectionable explanatory gaps. If that is right, conceivability would be
a good, defeasible guide to possibility.
Unlike the no-metaphysics-from-epistemology objection, this second objection to
(C2) is not too weak. It can be adapted to respond to Kripke's argument, (K1)-(C3). Not
only is
(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that
the explanans obtains without the explanandum
true, so is
(Ll*) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it seems possible
that the explanans obtains without the explanandum.
Like Levine, someone who endorses (K1)-(C3) accepts that there is an explanatory gap
between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain. So, from
(Li*), it follows that it seems possible that your C-fibers are firing but you are not in
pain. Someone who endorses (K1)-(C3), however, insists that this is not a mere seeming
possibility. It is a genuine possibility.
But, Levine can point out, because of the explanatory gap, it would seem possible
whether or not it was possible and, further, there is a defeater of the seeming possibility:
the physicalist case for thinking that being in pain is a physical property. The physicalist
case alone would not do this. Someone who endorses (K1)-(C3) might do so in spite of
accepting that there is a strong physicalist case. This is the textbook reading of Kripke, I
think. On the textbook reading, Kripke accepts
(C3) It is possible that there is a zombie world
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but acknowledges that there is a strong case against it. Levine is in position both to
explain why that your C-fibers are firing but you are not in pain seems possible-because
of the explanatory gap-but is impossible.
There were two problems with the no-metaphysics-from-epistemology objection.
These led to two constraints on a successful objection to (C2). Levine's second
objection, (L1)-(L6), meets both.17
6. WHAT IS WRONG WITH LEVINE'S SECOND OBJECTION
(L1) is not true, though. There are counterexamples to it. One comes out of the
following case.
You are looking at a painting. You do not know whether it is beautiful. You
know that you like it, but I distinguish that from knowing whether it is beautiful. I hope
this is not controversial. Plenty of people like paintings they know are ugly.
A friend helpfully points out that the painting has certain features: it is composed
a certain way and uses certain colors. You then see that it is a beautiful painting.
17 Levine endorses
(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that the explanans
obtains without the explanandum
and also something like the converse:
If it is conceivable that an explanans obtains without an explanandum, there is an
explanatory gap between the two.
"Something like" because, stated that way, the converse is not true. Why did the egg break? It fell. That is
a fine explanation, there is no explanatory gap here, but it is conceivable that the egg falls and not break.
So the converse thesis needs to be precisified.
Take the imprecise thesis, though. Combined with (L1), we get a biconditional:
There is an explanatory gap between two facts iff it is conceivable that the explanans
obtains without the explanandum.
I doubt Levine endorses the biconditional as an explanation of what an explanatory gap is. (See, for
example, his replies to critics at the 2004 Pacific APA.) Still, if you take the biconditional to be
explanatory, you have a clearer explanation of the explanatory gap than the one I offered. Unlike that
attempt, the biconditional does not make use of the mysterious 'mysterious.' This is further reason to like
(L1): it helps provide a less mysterious account of the explanatory gap than the one Levine and I give.
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Furthermore, you come to believe that any painting that looked that way would be
beautiful.
Still, it might remain mysterious to you why paintings that look like that are
beautiful. Satisfied that the painting is beautiful, you might nevertheless ask your friend
why the obtaining of the fact that the painting is beautiful is explained by the obtaining of
the fact that it looks a certain way. This suggests that there is an explanatory gap
between the two facts. (Levine is satisfied that pain is C-fiber firing, he just wants to
know why the obtaining of the fact that your C-fibers are firing explains the obtaining of
the fact that you are in pain.)
If (L1) is true, then, it is conceivable that the painting looks just the way it does
but is not beautiful. That is not conceivable, though. What is conceivable is that the
painting looks just that way and you do not like it and, also, that it looks just that way and
other people do not like it. It is also conceivable that it looks just that way and you and
others do not think it is beautiful. That it looks that way and is not beautiful, though, is
inconceivable. So
(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that
the explanans obtains without the explanandum
is false.
There is another counterexample to it. It is provided by a Moorean metaethic.
Consider three Moorean theses-whether they are exactly theses of Principia Ethica
(Moore (1993)), I do not argue. They are at least like theses in that book.
First, badness simpliciter is a moral property. Burning cats just for fun, for
example, is bad. Not just bad for your conscience or bad for the cats. Bad, period.
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Second, if any moral property is instantiated, its instantiations are determined by
the instantiation of non-moral properties. The instantiation of a property x is determined
by the instantiation of a property y just in case the instantiation of y suffices for the
instantiation of x and this is true across all possible worlds, not just the actual world.
Since badness is a moral property, if it is instantiated, its instantiation is determined by
the instantiation of non-moral properties. Being an instance of burning a cat just for fun,
for example, is a non-moral property. Say that Alan burns a cat just for fun (for short,
Alan burns a cat). His act is bad and the instantiation of badness here is determined by
the instantiation of the non-moral property, being an instance of cat burning.
Third, for any non-moral property, it is an open question why things instantiating
that property instantiate badness, if they do. It is an open question why, for example,
when someone burns a cat, his act is bad. It is not an open question whether his act is
bad. Everyone knows that it is. What is open is why this bad act is a bad act.
Moore does not say much about what an open question is. An example will fix
ideas about it. Take the question, "Why is cat burning bad?" Take, also, a conceivable
answer to it: cat burning is bad because it hurts the cat. Someone might accept the
answer-I do-without thinking it is a perfectly satisfying explanation. The answer just
produces a new question, "Why is hurting cats bad?" Take a conceivable answer to that
question: hurting cats, and, thus, burning cats, is bad because cats don't like it. Someone
might accept that answer while still thinking it, too, is a less than perfectly satisfying
explanation. He might wonder, "Why is doing something that cats don't like bad?" A
trail of why-questions has been opened up and it is hard to see where (or if) it stops.
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Each answer to each question in the series seems to raise a question analogous to the first.
This is the sense in which it is an open question why cat burning is bad.1 8
Moore, of course, did not talk about explanatory gaps. However, just as for any
non-moral property, it is an open question why something instantiating it instantiates
badness (if it does), I think Moore would have accepted that there is an explanatory gap
between any non-moral fact and the fact that an action is bad.
Hence, since it is an open question why cat burning is bad, it is safe to assume
that there is an explanatory gap between the fact that an action is a cat burning and the
fact that it is bad. If there were no such gap, there would be an explanation for why cat
burning is bad and if there were such an explanation, it would not be an open question
why it is bad.19
If
(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that
the explanans obtains without the explanandum
is true, it is conceivable that an action is a cat burning but it is not bad. This is
inconceivable, though. Perhaps it is conceivable that people think cat burning is good or
are all for cat-burning but it is inconceivable that cat burning is not bad.
That it is inconceivable is crucial to Moorean moral epistemology. The way you
figure out which things are bad is by forming a clear and distinct idea of them and seeing
if they strike you as bad. There is no clearly and distinctly conceiving that there is a cat
burning without having it strike you as bad.
18 Much more on open questions is in chapter one.
19 Note that on Moore's view, the gap is objectionable. That an action is a cat burning implies that the
action is bad because of Moore's determination thesis: the instantiation of being an instance of cat burning
determines the instantiation of badness. In this way, the gap between the fact that an action is a cat burning
and the fact that it is bad is like the gap between the fact that your C-fibers are firing and the fact that you
are in pain.
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We thus have another counterexample to (L1). Well, calling it a
"counterexample" might be pushing it. It is a counterexample if the three Moorean
theses above are possible. There are reasons to think they are not.2 0 Even if they are not,
though, is it not plausible that this is because they conflict with (L1).
7. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BEING IN PAIN, BEAUTY, AND BADNESS
There are a lot of differences between the pain and beauty and badness cases, of course.
Maybe they matter to whether the beauty and badness cases are genuine counterexamples
to (L1). I focus on disanalogies between beauty and pain. There are similar disanalogies
between badness and pain.
There is an explanatory gap between the fact that a painting looks a certain way
and the fact that it is beautiful. However, it is a priori that if any painting is beautiful,
then it looks some way or other. By contrast, take the gap between the fact that your C-
fibers are firing and the fact that you are in pain. It is not a priori that if you are in pain,
then you are in some physical state or other. It might be true but it is not a priori.
This is a genuine difference between the two cases but it does not have anything
to do with whether there is an explanatory gap in both cases. At best, I think, it shows
that the degree of mysteriousness between the fact that the painting is beautiful and the
fact that it looks a certain way is partial. You know a priori that beautiful paintings have
to look some way or other so it is not totally mysterious why the obtaining of the fact that
the painting is beautiful is to be explained by the obtaining of some fact or other about
how it looks. What you don't understand is why the obtaining of the fact that the
painting looks this way explains the obtaining of the fact that it is beautiful. This is like
20 See Thomson (1997) which argues that there is no property badness, much less a moral property.
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Levine's position. He knows-albeit a posteriori-that the obtaining of the fact that you
are in pain is to be explained by the obtaining of some physical fact or other. What he
does not understand is why the obtaining of the fact that your C-fibers are firing explains
the obtaining of the fact that you are in pain.
A further difference between the pain and beauty cases is that whereas it is clear
in the pain case what needs explaining-the way it feels-it is not clear in the aesthetic
case. That beautiful things merit appreciation? That they produce pleasure? That they
produce pleasure in those who know they are beautiful?
Whereas we have a pretty good grip on what pain is, we have a pretty bad grip on
beauty with the result that it is not so clear what needs explaining in the beauty case.
Again, this is a genuine difference but, again, I do not think it shows that there is a
significant difference between the beauty gap and the pain gap. That we do not know
what is missing from our explanation of why the fact that that painting is beautiful
obtains does not show that nothing is missing.
A third difference between the pain and beauty cases is that it does not seem
possible that just this appearance fact obtains and the fact that the painting is beautiful
fails to obtain; by contrast, it does seem possible that the fact that your C-fibers are firing
obtains and the fact that you are in pain does not. Maybe this shows that the idea of an
explanatory gap in the beauty case is out of place. You only get an explanatory gap when
it seems like the explanans could obtain without the explanandum. If so, the beauty case
is no counterexample to (L1). There is no explanatory gap between the fact that a
painting looks this way and the fact that it is beautiful.
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Again, there is a genuine difference here but, again, it does not show that there is
no explanatory gap in the beauty case. The idea of an explanatory gap between two facts
is that there is no explaining why the one obtains in terms of why the other does. We
seem to have that in the beauty case. That it does not seem possible that the appearance
fact obtains without the beauty fact does not show that there is no gap unless we insist on
the thesis that if there is an explanatory gap between two facts, then that the explanans
obtains without the explanandum seems possible. Like (L1), I think this thesis is
plausible but false. The beauty case is a counterexample.
Finally, most roughly, it might be objected that there is a total mystery about why
the obtaining of the fact that your C-fibers are firing explains the obtaining of the fact that
you are feeling any way at all. There is an aspect of being in pain that is left totally
unexplained by the fact that your C-fibers are firing. In the beauty case, it might be
objected, things are otherwise. Nothing is totally mysterious. You can see that the
obtaining of the appearance fact has something to do with the obtaining of the beauty
fact. This is shown by the fact that you saw that the colors and composition of the
painting were relevant to its being beautiful. Only a partial mystery remains.
I do not know whether the objection is right but, even conceding that it is, this
difference does not show that there is no explanatory gap in the beauty case. It just
shows that the gap in the beauty case differs slightly in character from the gap in the pain
case. Both gaps are partial but the mental gap is partial because one aspect of being in
pain is left totally mysterious.21 According to
21 This is a difficult issue. As mentioned above, it might be that part of being beautiful is meriting
appreciation. If so, then perhaps there is a total mystery about how to explain the fact that the painting
merits appreciation in terms of the fact that it looks a certain way.
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(L1) If there is an explanatory gap between two facts, it is conceivable that
the explanans obtains without the explanandum,
there is a connection between explanatory gaps and conceivability, not just a connection
between explanatory gaps of a certain character and conceivability.
So I conclude that despite the disanalogies between pain and beauty, the beauty
case is a counterexample to (L1). Mutatis mutandis for badness. This will be
controversial. It depends, among other things, on separating a painting's being beautiful
from its being liked and that is controversial and I haven't argued for it. Likewise, the
badness case is only a counterexample if the three Moorean theses are possible and that is
controversial (see footnote eleven) and I have not argued for it.
Whether or not the beauty and badness cases are counterexamples, though, they
have a structure that shows that (L1) is false. They are cases in which there is an
explanatory gap between certain facts even though it is inconceivable that the explanans
obtains without the explanandum. A view like this does seem to be possible even if the
examples of it I gave are not. That is all that is needed to show that (L1) is false and,
therefore, that Levine's second objection to the zombie argument is unsuccessful.
8. CONCLUSION
We started with the zombie argument and Levine's no-metaphysics-from-epistemology
objection. We rejected the objection but what is wrong with it is interesting. It shows
that a successful objection has to allow that conceivability is evidence for possibility and
also rebut Kripke's version of the zombie argument.
Levine's second objection succeeded on both counts but it contains a false
premise. The premise is false for an interesting reason, though: there could be an
46
___I __ __··
explanatory gap even though it is inconceivable the explanans obtains without the
explanandum. This was shown by considering an aesthetic theory and metaethic. These
theories are in some ways like Levine's. Consider the metaethic. Like Levine, the
Moorean thinks there are objectionable explanatory gaps. Levine's view-that there is
an objectionable explanatory gap between physical (or functional) facts and sensational
facts-is pretty common. The Moorean view is not; it is thought to be pretty weird. But
what is weird about these views is the same: they claim that certain facts imply other
facts and insist that nevertheless there is an explanatory gap between them. (I think it is,
in part, because of the second conjunct that the Moorean insists that moral facts are non-
natural.) One upshot of the paper is that that the Moorean view is better off than people
think or, alternatively, that Levine's view is worse off.
Another is that, for all Levine says, the zombie argument is sound even though it
seems that something must be wrong with it. But, also, even though Levine's second
objection does not work, it seems something must be right about it. There are some
propositions that you believe are impossible without understanding why they are
impossible. Some of these seem to be conceivable. No doubt some of these beliefs about
impossibility are true and so (C2) is false. But which are the conceivable impossibilities?
Why them?
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CHAPTER THREE
IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE
Take a novelization of Macbeth and a novel, Macbeth*, just like it except that in
Macbeth* you read that the killing of Duncan is morally permissible. Imagining what
happens in Macbeth is easy. There is no trouble, for example, imagining that Duncan is
killed or that he is killed for the basest reasons. Imagining that the killing is morally
permissible, though, is something else. We resist imagining that. In short, Macbeth*, but
not Macbeth, induces imaginative resistance. Why?
That there is imaginative resistance to novels is interesting. Prima facie, an
author has complete control in directing the reader's imagination. He can have us
imagine that animals talk, that snowmen sing, that a man wakes up as a cockroach.
Because there is imaginative resistance (for short, resistance), the appearance is
misleading; there are limits to authorial control.
Why there is resistance is also interesting. It illuminates the natures of
imagination and possibility and also of the relation between them.2 2
1. WHAT RESISTANCE IS
I focus on propositional imagining-imagining that a man is killed, imagining that the
killing is impermissible, and so on. Some propositions induce resistance. We resist
imagining that such-and-such.
"Imagining"? I can say a lot about what I do not mean. Imagining is not
supposing. It is no harder to suppose that the killing of Duncan is morally permissible
22 Imaginative resistance is discussed in, among other places, Currie (2002), Gendler (2000), Hume
(1985a), Matravers (2003), Moran (1994) (which uses the Macbeth example), Tanner (1994), Walton
(1994) Weatherson (forthcoming), and Yablo (2002). "Imaginative resistance" comes from Moran.
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than to suppose that it is morally impermissible. It is easy enough to suppose that it is
morally permissible for the purpose of a reductio.
Imagining can be picturing but it need not be. There is a perfectly good kind of
imagining such that I can imagine that the gross national product is rising even though I
cannot picture this. That is the kind of imagining I have in mind. If imagining were just
picturing, there would be no contrast between imagining that the killing of Duncan is
impermissible and that it is permissible. It is as hard to picture the first as the second, but
only the second induces resistance.
Imagining is not believing that something is true in a fiction. What you imagine
need not be part of any fiction. That this table is a bit to the left is imaginable, but the
proposition that this table is a bit to the left is part of no fiction. Does believing that
something is true in a fiction involve imagining it? More on that later.
Imagining is not having something seem possible. Lots of propositions seem
possible to me now but I am not imagining anything. Does imagining at least involve a
proposition's seeming possible? Can I imagine something that does not seem possible?
More on that later.
Imagining is what I engage in when I read Macbeth and imagine that Duncan is
killed.2 3 Resistance is what happens when I read Macbeth* and try to imagine that
Duncan's killing is morally permissible. What resistance amounts to, though, is disputed.
23 Philosophical accounts of imagination are extremely hard to come by. Walton (1990) is largely about
the imagination but there Walton writes, "What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of
dimensions along which imaginings can vary; shouldn't we now spell out what they have in common?
Yes, if we can. But I can't. Fortunately, an intuitive understanding of what it is to imagine...is sufficient
to proceed with our investigation." (19)
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Hume says it is difficulty in imagining. It is hard to imagine that Duncan's
killing is morally permissible; "a very violent effort" is required to do so. (Hume
(1985a): 247)
Tamar Szab6 Gendler, by contrast, says that resistance is refusal to imagine. I
refuse to imagine that Duncan's killing is morally permissible. "The primary source
of...resistance," she writes, "is not our inability to imagine morally deviant situations but
our unwillingness to do so." (Gendler (2000): 56)
Kendall Walton, by further contrast, says that resistance is inability to imagine. I
cannot imagine that Duncan's killing is morally permissible. "I might imagine [believing
the killing is right]," he writes, "I cannot imagine [that it is]." (Walton (1994): 49)
The puzzle of imaginative resistance (for short, the puzzle) is explaining why
resistance occurs.24 Hume, Gendler, and Walton differ on what needs explaining, as
between:
(1) Certain imaginers have difficulty imagining certain propositions.
(2) Certain imaginers refuse to imagine certain propositions.
(3) Certain imaginers are unable to imagine certain propositions.
Hume is right that some propositions are difficult for some people to imagine. A
caveman might have trouble imagining that someone sails west and winds up in the east.
It does not occur to him to imagine that the world is round. However, I do not find it
plausible that resistance to Macbeth* is a matter of difficulty. It is not that with a violent
effort I can imagine that the killing of Duncan is morally permissible-I am trying very
hard, I am being very imaginative. Still, I resist it; so I suggest putting Hume's puzzle
aside and focusing just on Gendler's and Walton's.
24 "The puzzle of imaginative resistance" comes from Gendler.
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Gendler is right that some imaginers refuse to imagine some propositions.
Someone who has bet his life savings that he won't imagine that he has three hands will
make every effort not to. Asked, he will refuse.
Of course, resistance to Macbeth* does not derive from a bet. Why would I
refuse to imagine that Duncan's killing is morally permissble? Gendler suggests:
GENDLER'S PROPOSAL-We resist imagining all and only those
propositions such that imagining them (a) requires us to think of the actual
world as somehow other than we think it is and (b) the world's being that
way repulses us.25
Gendler's proposal explains resistance to Macbeth*. If it is morally permissible in any
world to kill basely then, moral principles being necessary, it is actually morally
permissible. But that is repulsive. So I refuse to imagine Macbeth*.
Gendler's proposal predicts, correctly, that I do not resist Macbeth. Imagining
that does not require me to think of the actual world as other than I think it is. Gendler's
proposal predicts, correctly, that I do not resist imagining that a man wakes up as a
cockroach; there is nothing repulsive about that. (Well, nothing morally repulsive about
it.)
Two questions: first, is
(2) Certain imaginers refuse to imagine certain propositions
a good characterization of resistance? Second, assuming it is, does Gendler's proposal
explain resistance? The answer to both questions is "no"-an example brings this out.
Consider this joke:
A man walks into a bar.
25 This considerably simplifies the proposal in Gendler (2000) but keeps its main idea.
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The joke-I don't know what else to call it-is not funny, and I resist imagining that it is.
Better, I resist imagining that the joke, just as it is, is funny and the facts that would make
it funny-facts about men and bars and bar jokes-are as they actually are.26 Gendler's
proposal does not predict resistance here. I am not repulsed by the joke's being funny.
What kind of comic prig would be so repulsed?
It follows that Gendler's proposal is flawed. The proposal explains some moral
resistance, but there is more resistance than moral resistance. Comic resistance is an
example of resistance to an evaluative but non-moral proposition. We can mark off the
evaluative/non-evaluative distinction well enough by example.
That a joke makes Alan laugh is non-evaluative; that a joke is funny is. That
there is an inch of paint on the canvas is non-evaluative; that the painting is beautiful is.
That a pen leaks is non-evaluative; that it is a bad pen is.
Hume thinks all resistance is evaluative resistance (Hume (1985a): 246-247), but
that is a mistake. Consider:
Shape-Alan ran his hands over the three-sided square.
Shape induces resistance, but does not express an evaluative proposition. Gendler's
proposal cannot explain resistance here. There is nothing replusive about Shape.
26 Some people, Gendler included, have no trouble imagining that the joke is funny (Gendler (2000): 79,
fn. 3). My guess is that such people think that funniness is a dispositional property: for something to be
funny is just for it to be disposed to make people laugh. And it is easy enough to imagine that people laugh
at the joke. Insofar as one resists imagining that a joke is funny but does not resist imagining that people
laugh at it, one has grounds for denying the dispositional analysis.
It is easy to imagine that a community laughs at bad jokes. Small children form such a
community. And crazy people:
When [mad people] laugh at things the rest of us don't think are funny, like the death of a
parent, they're not being penetrating...They're laughing because they're mad, too mad to
be able to tell what's funny any more. The rewards of being sane may not be very many
but knowing what's funny is one of them. (Amis (1984))
It seems there could be communities who laugh at jokes that are not funny. And it is no use saying that
what is funny is just what normal people are disposed to laugh at. Having a bad sense of humor does not
make you abnormal. This is a problem for the dispositional analysis of funniness.
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Perhaps resistance to Macbeth* is not akin to comic resistance or resistance to
Shape. Perhaps-but what is the reason to think not? Introspectively, my reactions to
Macbeth*, the proposition that the joke is funny, and Shape are the same. The prima
facie case is that evaluative resistance of the moral kind, evaluative resistance of the non-
moral kind, and non-evaluative resistance are of a piece. Absent some reason to doubt
the case, it is a problem for Gendler's proposal that it cannot explain some non-evaluative
resistance or some evaluative resistance.
Two points have emerged. First, the counterexamples to Gendler's proposal
suggest a constraint on a solution to the puzzle:
EVALUATIVE AND NON-EVALUATIVE-Some evaluative, non-moral
propositions induce resistance. Some non-evaluative propositions induce
resistance.
Gendler's proposal fits badly with this constraint.27
Second, resistance to Shape shows that resistance is not refusal. It is not that I
refuse to imagine that something merely three-sided is square. Why would I refuse? I
seem unable to imagine Shape. Likewise, I think, I am unable to imagine Macbeth* and
that the bar joke is funny. So
(3) Certain propositions are unimaginable for certain imaginers
is the best characterization of imaginative resistance. Our puzzle is to explain why (3) is
true.
27 Gregory Currie's proposal in Currie (2002) has the same strengths as Gendler's but, like Gendler's, it
does not fit well with EVALUATIVE AND NON-EVALUATIVE.
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2. SOME IMPOSSIBILITY PROPOSALS
We started by resisting Macbeth*. Considering Hume's and Gendler's theories of what
resistance is and Gendler's proposal for why we resist, we were led to the view that
resistance is inability to imagine a proposition and that we resist far more than Macbeth*.
In particular, there is more to resistance than evaluative resistance. An obvious proposal
now suggests itself:
THE OBVIOUS PROPOSAL-We resist all and only the impossible
propositions. We resist them because whatever is imaginable is possible,
whatever impossible unimaginable.
The obvious proposal fits with EVALUATIVE AND NON-EVALUATIVE. Those evaluative,
non-moral propositions that are impossible are resisted, and so are those non-evaluative,
impossible propositions. For example, Macbeth*, Shape, and the proposition that the bar
joke is funny are impossible and so resisted.
The obvious proposal is simple, and makes use of a thesis about the relation
between imaginability and possibility that many people accept anyway. That is all to the
good, but the proposal has some serious flaws; we can bring them out as follows.
Alan thinks that base killing is morally permissible. Macbeth* seems to induce
no resistance in him. What seems to induce resistance is Bad Macbeth, a novel just like
Macbeth* except that, in Bad Macbeth, one reads that the killing of Duncan is morally
forbidden (in Macbeth itself, the killing is not explicitly morally evaluated). The obvious
proposal has to deny the appearances. For the propositions Macbeth* expresses are
impossible, the propositions Bad Macbeth expresses are not. Macbeth* seems
imaginable to Alan; according to the obvious proposal, it isn't. Alan seems to resist Bad
Macbeth; according to the obvious proposal, he doesn't.
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These consequences are implausible. Our understanding of resistance comes
from our reaction to cases, including our reaction to Macbeth*. But if it turns out that
Alan, not us, is right about the permissibility of baseless killing, the obvious proposal
entails that we did not resist Macbeth*. This seems obviously, but instructively, wrong.
The Alan case shows that
POSSIBLE-Propositions that are possible can be resistance-inducers.
Alan resists the possible-indeed, necessary-proposition that baseless killing is
impermissible; he resists because his moral beliefs are so skewed. What this also brings
out is that resistance can vary from imaginer to imaginer, depending on the imaginer's
beliefs.
RELATIVITY-Resistance is imaginer-relative: what induces resistance in
one imaginer need not induce resistance in another.2 8
The Obvious Proposal is inconsistent with both POSSIBLE and RELATIVITY. If it is true,
only impossible propositions are resisted and all imaginers resist the same propositions:
the impossible ones. It is easy enough to modify the obvious proposal to respect these
constraints:
THE MODIFIED PROPOSAL-We resist all and only those propositions we
believe are impossible. We resist them because we believe they are
impossible.
Because there are a few varieties of impossibility, there are a few varieties of the
modified proposal. Maybe we are unable to imagine all and only those propositions we
believe are naturally impossible, that is, impossible given the actual laws of nature. If so,
the modified proposal is better put as:
28 Should resistance be time-relativized or relative to a set of beliefs? After all, Alan, that very imaginer,
is able to imagine that baseless killing is wrong-he would just have to change his beliefs. I ignore this
complication.
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THE NATURAL IMPoSSIBILITY PROPOSAL-We resist all and only those
propositions we believe are naturally impossible. We resist them because
we believe they are naturally impossible.
This is a non-starter. The natural impossibility proposal clearly does not provide a
sufficient condition for imaginative resistance. Science fiction stories express one natural
impossibility after another, but readers, even those who know the propositions are
naturally impossible, have no trouble imagining them.
Perhaps what is unimaginable is what we believe to be conceptually impossible,
that is, what is a priori impossible. If so, the modified proposal is better put as:
THE CONCEPTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY PROPOSAL-We resist all and only those
propositions we believe are conceptually impossible. We resist them
because we believe they are conceptually impossible.
The proposal does not produce a necessary condition for resistance. Plenty of people do
not think that moral necessitites are a priori necessities. It is not, they say, conceptually
impossible that baseless killing is right. But such people resist imagining that base
killing is right. Moran, for example, does.29
Perhaps what is unimaginable is what is believed metaphysically impossible, that
is, false in all possible worlds. If so, the modified proposal is better put as:
THE METAPHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY PROPOSAL-We resist all and only
those propositions we believe are metaphysically impossible. We resist
them because we believe they are metaphysically impossible.
This is insufficient. I believe it is metaphysically impossible that a man wakes up as a
cockroach, but that is imaginable. My reaction to The Metamorphosis is not at all like
my reaction to Macbeth*.
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29 Cf. Moran (1994): 101-102.
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Gendler claims that the metaphysical impossibility proposal does not even
produce a necessary condition for imaginative resistance. She claims that the following
story induces resistance.
The Mice
Once upon a time there were a bunch of mice. The mice who had white
fur were hardworking and industrious, but the mice who had black fur
were slothful and shiftless...So it was not surprising that the mice with
white fur tended to be much better off than the mice with black fur...
Even so, the mice with white fur were very generous to the mice with
black fur. They gave bits of cheese to the black mouse babies. They left
piles of nuts and seeds in the black mouse neighborhoods. And obviously,
they provided the black mice with role models of diligence and industry.
But the mice with black fur just kept to their old ways. They seemed
constitutionally incapable of changing...Some of the white mice kept
providing the black mice with food and other necessities, but most did not.
And that was the right thing to do. For the distribution of resources in the
mouse world reflected the relative merits of the two mouse groups. All
the mice got what they deserved. (Gendler (2000): 73-74)
Gendler writes, "it is virtually impossible for us to take The Mice as anything but an
extremely crude allegory for race relations. As such, the story evokes...imaginative
resistance" (ibid.). If so, the metaphysical impossibility proposal does not produce a
necessary condition for resistance-no one thinks the propositions expressed by The
Mice are metaphysically impossible (nevermind that mice can't be shiftless). But I do
not think the story induces resistance. I agree with Gendler that the story is a crude
allegory for race relations. It is hard to believe that the story is an apt allegory. But I do
not resist the story. In fact, it is because I can imagine The Mice that I can see it is such a
crude allegory.
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3. WALTON AND WEATHERSON'S PROPOSAL
The metaphysical impossibility proposal seems to give a necessary condition for
resistance. Gendler's mice story is the only proposed counterexample to it, and it does
not succeed. Nonetheless, the metaphysical impossibility proposal is false; its proposed
sufficient condition is not a sufficient condition.
The idea that resistance has something to do with what one believes to be
impossible is attractive. The proposition that base killing is morally permissible induces
resistance in me. So does the proposition expressed by Shape. So does the proposition
that the bar joke is funny. By contrast, neither Macbeth nor Bad Macbeth nor The Mice
induce resistance. The fact that the first group of propositions is (believed to be)
impossible and the second group (believed to be) possible seems important in explaining
resistance. The fact that there are no convincing examples of resistance-inducers that are
believed to be possible is important.
Also, the fact that an action is morally impermissible because it is a base killing
seems important for explaining our resistance to Macbeth*. Consider our resistance to
Shape. The fact that an object is not a square because it has only three sides seems
important for explaining our resistance to Shape. Consider our resistance to the
proposition that the joke is funny. The fact that the joke is not funny because it is so
lame seems important for explaining our resistance here.
Walton's proposal builds around these facts; the proposal has lately been
improved by Brian Weatherson. The Walton/Weatherson (henceforth, W/W) proposal is
complicated; we will need some background to understand it. 30
30 See Walton (1994) and Weatherson (forthcoming).
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Of the impossible propositions, some are compound. A proposition is compound
iff it is logically analyzable into conjuncts.31 A proposition is prime otherwise. So, that
Alan is tall and Alan is not tall is a compound impossibility. That something is non-
identical with itself is a prime impossibility.
Among the compound impossibilities, some are asymmetric, the rest symmetric.
A compound impossibility is asymmetric iff one conjunct is (or would be) false in virtue
of the other being true but not vice versa. That act A is a base, morally permissible
killing is an asymmetric compound impossibility. It is compound, according to W/W,
being analyzable into the proposition that act A is a base killing and act A is morally
permissible. It is also asymmetric: the second conjunct would be false in virtue of the
first being true (an action is morally impermissible in virtue of being a base killing) but
not vice versa (an action is not a base killing in virtue of being morally impermissible,
but rather in virtue of the behavior of its agent).
The compound impossibilities that are not asymmetric are symmetric. For
example, that something is not identical with itself and twice two is five is symmetric.
Neither conjunct is false in virtue of the other being true. That something is good and not
good is also symmetric.
Setting aside the subtle question of how exactly to understand "in virtue of," the
W/W proposal is:
THE W/W PROPOSAL-We are unable to imagine all and only those
propositions we believe are asymmetric compound impossibilities. We
are unable to imagine them because we believe they are asymmetric
compound impossibilities.32
31 As Weatherson notes, he needs to assume that propositions have structure and, in particular, that they
can be conjunctive. This assumption is controversial. See Weatherson (2004): 4.
32 Weatherson's proposal is importantly different. He believes that we are unable to imagine all and only
asymmetric compound impossibilities. Whether or not we believe a proposition is an asymmetric
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The proposal has a lot going for it. It is consistent with EVALUATIVE AND NON-
EVALUATIVE, POSSIBLE, and RELATIVITY. It gets the cases of resistance and non-
resistance that we have considered right.
However, it gives neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for resistance.
Not necessary: I believe that the proposition that something is not identical with itself is a
prime impossibility. I believe it is not decomposable into conjuncts. Still, I resist it.
That something is good and not good is, I believe, a symmetric compound impossibility.
Still, I resist it.
Not sufficient: it is imaginable that there is a physical duplicate of me and it has
no consciousness. I think this is an asymmetric compound impossibility. It is
impossible: any physical duplicate of me is a mental duplicate and, since I am conscious,
so is my duplicate. It an asymmetric compound: the right conjunct is false in virtue of the
left conjunct being true but not vice versa. If something is not a physical duplicate of me,
this is in virtue of a physical difference, not a mental difference. So if it is imaginable
that there is a physical duplicate of me and it has no consciousness-and I think this is-
then the W/W proposal does not give a sufficient condition for resistance.
The case is controversial. Some deny that it is imaginable and others deny that it
is impossible. So I do not want to rest much argumentative weight on it. Still, I think it
is at least a prima facie problem for the W/W proposal. Our reaction to the case is prima
facie different from our reaction to Macbeth*.
I conclude that the W/W proposal is not right. None of the impossibility
proposals we have considered is right. Some predict resistance where there is none;
compound impossibility is irrelevant to our ability to imagine it. I reject this proposal for the same reasons
I reject the obvious proposal: it is inconsistent with POSSIBLE and RELATIVrrY.
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others fail to predict resistance where there is some. Some do both. On the one hand, an
inductive argument against impossibility proposals is starting to look attractive. On the
other, since we have seen no resistance-inducer that is believed to be contingent, I think
that some sort of impossibility proposal is right.
4. THE ESSENTIAL PROPOSAL
Part of what is resistance-inducing about the proposition that Alan ran his hands over the
three-sided square is that having just three sides is inconsistent with what it is to be a
square. Shape, then, expresses an essentially impossible proposition: it represents a
square as lacking one of its essential properties. Generally, a proposition is essentially
impossible iff it represents something as lacking one of its essential properties; otherwise,
it is essentially possible. That a square has just three sides is essentially impossible, that
a square is red is essentially possible.
A property is essential to something iff it is one of the group of properties that the
thing has to have to be what it is. Being four-sided, for example, is essential to being a
square, as is having four angles, and having sides of equal length.
Not all metaphysical impossibilities are essentially impossible. Some properties a
thing could not have lacked are not essential to it. For example, it is essential to me to be
a person, that is part of what I am. It is no part of what I am that I am the sole member of
singleton Tyler. However, it is impossible for me to exist without being a member of
singleton Tyler. In any world in which I exist, I am a member of that set. That I exist but
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am not a member of singleton Tyler, then, is essentially possible but metaphysically
impossible. 33
Any essential impossibility is, I believe, metaphysically impossible. It is
essentially impossible that a square is just three sided or that it has an acute angle or that
it has unequal sides. All of these propositions are metaphysically impossible, too.
All resistance-inducers are believed to be essentially impossible. Take Shape.
What it is to be square is, among other things, to have four sides. So Shape expresses an
essential impossibility.
Suggestion: we are unable to imagine all and only those propositions we believe
are essentially impossible.
This is not quite right. I believe it is essential to being a person that you have a
human body but the start of The Metamorphosis induces no resistance in me. I can
imagine that Gregor Samsa, that person, woke up with a cockroach's body. So the
suggestion does not provide a sufficient condition for resistance.34
The Metamorphosis is instructive here. By the end of it, there is no imagining
that Samsa survives. This is not simply because he is missing essential properties. He is
missing essential properties from the beginning, and the beginning induces no resistance.
Rather, by the end, he is too little like Samsa, too much like a roach to imagine that it is
Samsa scuttling around his room. What this suggests is that what induces resistance is
not just a proposition that you believe gets the essence of something wrong but one that
33 The singleton example comes from Fine (1994), in which the distinction between essential properties
and properties a thing could not have lacked is illuminated.
34 Joseph Almog seems to endorse the suggestion (or the thesis that we are unable to imagine those
propositions that are essentially impossible) in his work on Descartes and the mind-body problem, Almog
(2002a, 2002b). The Samsa case shows that the suggestion is mistaken and there are other
counterexamples to it. Almog, like many people, thinks it is essential to being a person that you come from
sperm and egg. So the suggestion predicts that he resists that God made Eve-a woman-from Adam's
rib. Or he resists that she is a woman. I would be surprised if he resists either.
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does so by confusing the thing with something else. For example, what is resistance-
inducing is not only that (you believe) it is essentially impossible that Samsa lack a
human body and mind. It is also that (you believe) something with all the properties the
protagonist has at the end of the story is a roach.
Shape is a resistance-inducer. What is resistance-inducing is not only that (you
believe) it is essentially impossible that a square lack four sides. It is also that (you
believe) a three-sided figure is a triangle. Presented with Shape, you are confused about
what you are supposed to imagine: a three-sided figure? Or a square?
That the bar joke is funny is a resistance-inducer. What is resistance-inducing is
not only that (you believe) it is essentially impossible that a funny joke lack cleverness or
the element of surprise or absurdity or whatever. It is also that (you believe) a joke like
that is lame and stupid. Presented with the proposition that the bar joke is funny, you are
confused about what you are supposed to imagine: the lame, stupid bar joke? Or a funny
joke?
Macbeth* is a resistance-inducer. In particular, that the baseless killing of
Duncan is morally permissible is a resistance-inducer. What is resistance-inducing is not
only that (you believe) it is essentially impossible that a morally permissible killing be
done for no good reason. It is also that (you believe) a baseless killing is morally
impermissible. Presented with the Macbeth*, you are confused about what you are
supposed to imagine: a baseless killing? Or a morally permissible killing?
The Samsa case shows that we resist only some essentially impossible
propositions. The Samsa, joke, Shape, and Macbeth* cases show that resistance-inducers
are those that get the essence of things wrong in a certain way. They portray the subject
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as something other than what it is. This subset of the essentially impossible propositions
is the essentially confused propositions. This suggests:
THE ESSENTIAL PROPOSAL-We resist all and only those propositions we
believe are essentially confused. We resist them because we believe they
are essentially confused.
The Samsa case shows that the essential proposal can explain non-evaluative resistance.
The joke case shows that it can explain evaluative, non-moral resistance. So the essential
proposal is consistent with EVALUATIVE AND NON-EVALUATIVE.
The essential proposal is also consistent with POSSmBLE and RELATIvrrY. So long
as your beliefs about essence are skewed enough, the essential proposal predicts you can
resist a possible proposition. You mistakenly think it is essentially confused. Such a
case also shows that the essential proposal is consistent with RELATIVITY. What induces
resistance can vary from imaginer to imaginer.
Unlike the W/W proposal, the essential proposal predicts the possibility of
someone (a) believing that anything that is a physical duplicate is a mental duplicate
while (b) being able to imagine there is a physical duplicate of herself that is not
conscious. She just has to hold that it is not essentially impossible that a physical
duplicate lack consciousness. She has to hold that it is not essential to a physical state to
be a mental state. She can hold this even while conceding that there is a necessary
connection between the two, just as there is a necessary connection between my existing
and my singleton existing. So if she thinks it is essentially possible that something is in
certain physical states without being conscious, she will be able to imagine that there is a
physical duplicate of her that it not conscious.35
35 What is harder for the essential proposal is explaining why some people cannot imagine that there is a
physical duplicate that is not a mental duplicate. The essential proposal predicts resistance if the person
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5. OBJECTIONS TO THE ESSENTIAL PROPOSAL
The essential proposal seems subject to a counterexample. Consider this story, adapted
from one by Graham Priest.
Shopping in a flea market in Indonesia, Sylvan came across a small, empty
box... with an elephant figurine in one corner.
If the proposition this story expresses is imaginable, the essential proposal is false. What
it is to be an empty box is to be a box with nothing in it and what it is to be a non-empty
box is to be a box with something in it. Everyone believes this and so everyone believes
the proposition expressed is essentially confused. There is a simple argument that the
proposition is imaginable: it is true in the story that there is an empty box with something
in it. So it is imaginable that there is an empty box with something in it. So the essential
proposal is false. Gendler argues like this against the conceptual impossibility proposal
(Gendler (2000): 68).
I agree that it is true in the story that there is an empty box with something in it. I
just deny that it follows that it is imaginable that there is an empty box with something in
it. According to Gendler, any proposition accepted as true in a fiction is imaginable. I
deny this. Take someone who cannot imagine that there are physical duplicates of people
but without consciousness. Now consider this story:
Albert was a physical duplicate of Alan but without consciousness. He
spent most days in front of a TV.
believes that it is essential to being a physical duplicate that you are a mental duplicate and also that what it
is to be a mental non-duplicate is to be a physical non-duplicate. If so, the person resists imagining that
there is a physical duplicate that is not a mental duplicate. The proposition is resistance-inducing not only
because (he believes) it is essentially impossible that a physical duplicate is not a mental duplicate. It is
also because (he believes) a mental non-duplicate is a physical non-duplicate. He thinks, "What is it I am
supposed to imagine? A physical duplicate? Or a physical non-duplicate?"
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I assume that our imaginer can't imagine the proposition the first sentence expresses.
Still, can't she see what is true in the story? Asked, "What happened in the story?" she
won't say, "I have no idea" or "Someone was in front of a TV but I can't tell you
anything about him." She will say, "There was a physical duplicate of Alan who had no
consciousness and spent most days in front of a TV. (What a story.)" So what is
accepted as true in a fiction need not be imaginable. So the apparent counterexample is
no counterexample to the essential proposal.
A second objection to the essential proposal is as follows. Some people do not
believe in essences. So they do not believe any proposition is essentially confused. If
these people experience resistance, then the essential proposal is false. In particular, it
does not give a necessary condition on imaginative resistance.
Analogs of this objection can be put to any impossibility proposal (except the
obvious proposal). There are people who do not think any proposition is impossible: they
have no truck with modality (or propositions). There are others who think that ethical
claims do not have truth values and, hence, think that there are no impossible ethical
propositions. So if they resist Macbeth*, it is not because they believe it expresses an
essentially confused proposition; they believe the sentence, "The killing of Duncan was
morally permissible" expresses no proposition. If these people experience resistance, so
much the worse for impossibility proposals-they do not give necessary conditions for
resistance.
It might be that this objection is a good one (the case that some impossibility
proposal is right is pretty strong, though). If so, all the impossibility proposals, except
the obvious proposal, are false. If so, the essential proposal is the best of a bad bunch.
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At worst, it gives only a sufficient condition for resistance. Since most people believe in
essences, the essential proposal will be able to explain resistance in most people. Of the
impossibility proposals, the essential proposal is best. It gets all the cases we have
considered right.
6. CONCLUSIONS
I began by clarifying the nature of imaginative resistance. I then criticized Gendler's
proposal, the obvious proposal, and some other impossibility proposals. Each was
rejected but what is wrong with each is interesting and leads to some constraints on a
solution to the puzzle.
I suggested a solution. If it is right, then a thing's essential properties are not
simply properties it has to have and there is a sort of impossibility, essential
impossibility, that is neither conceptual nor metaphysical nor natural.
Also, if it the essential proposal is right, imagination reveals beliefs not so much
about what is possible but about what is essential to things. I can imagine that I exist
without singleton Tyler. This is not because I think this is possible-I know it isn't-but
because I believe what I am has nothing to do with sets. By contrast, I cannot imagine
that singelton Tyler exists without me. So I have reason to think it is essential to
singleton Tyler to have me as a member.
I can imagine that I am in just the brain state I am in when I have a headache but
without feeling any pain at all. This is not because I think this is possible-I don't think
it is-but because I believe that what pain is has nothing to do with brains. By contrast, I
cannot imagine that the brain state exists without being a state of a brain. So I have
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reason to think it is essential to the state to be instantiated by a brain. I think this is
essentially Kripke's point at the end of Naming and Necessity: what it is to be in pain
differs from what it is to be in a certain brain state. Different essences, so different states.
It does not follow that there can be pain without a certain brain state. From their different
essences, it does not follow that I can exist without singleton Tyler or singleton Tyler
without me.
Regardless of whether the essential proposal is right, resistance itself illuminates
the nature of the imagination. It shows that imagining is distinct from accepting as true
in a fiction, distinct from seeming possible, and from supposing.
Distinguishing imagining from supposing, for example, is necessary for
preserving the imaginability/possibility link; there is no supposability/possibility link.
Making the distinction between imagining and supposing, however, raises the question of
what the difference comes to and how it allows for an imaginability/possibility link.
A case of moral imagination we have considered seems to me to show that the
link is not entailment. Alan the base killer can imagine that baseless killing is morally
permissible. So at least one impossibility is imaginable. Friends of the thesis that
imaginability entails possibility will respond in one of four ways.
First way: Alan is in some sense imagining an impossible proposition. However,
only a certain sort of imaginability entails possibility and Alan is not engaging in that
sort.
Second way: Alan is not imagining what he seems to be imagining. Instead, he is
in some mental state like imagining but one that does not entail possibility.
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Third way: Alan is confused about what he is imagining. He is imagining a
possible proposition, not the impossibility he seems to be imagining.
Fourth way: Alan is imagining what he thinks he is imagining and, appearances to
the contrary, the proposition is possible.
One or more of these responses might be plausible in cases of non-moral
imagining, for example, in response to a case in which someone seems to imagine that
water is not H20 or that Queen Elizabeth is the daughter of the Trumans. In the moral
case, the fourth, at least, is out of the question. If any proposition is impossible, that a
baseless killing is permissible is.36
The third reply is not much more plausible. It is hard to see just what possible
proposition Alan is confusing with that a baseless killing is permissible. Maybe he is
confusing that something just like a baseless killing is permissible with that a baseless
killing is permissible but so what? If the second is impossible, so is the first.
Mightn't Alan be confusing imagining that a baseless killing is permissible with
imagining that he believes that a baseless killing is permissible? No-there is a big
difference between those propositions and Alan is bright enough and alert enough to see
the difference between the two propositions.
36 Objection: "Not so: the case supports moral relativism: that a baseless killing is permissible is possible
relative to Alan's moral standards." Putting aside for a moment whether this is a good reply, if relativism
is a consequence of the thesis that conceivability entails possibility that is pretty interesting.
However, it is not a good reply. At least, adopting moral relativism only gives the thesis
temporary relief. Consider a non-moral case. Alan believes there cannot be composite objects. He seems
to be able to imagine that there are exactly two objects, two simple particles. Bob the mereological
universalist seems to be able to imagine that there are exactly three objects, two simple particles and the
thing they compose. It is not at all plausible that that there are exactly two objects is possible relative to
Alan's beliefs and impossible relative to Bob's beliefs. The proposition is either impossible or it isn't. So
either the second, third, or fourth reply has to be invoked by someone who believes that conceivability
entails possibility. For reasons analogous to those given in the moral case, I think each is implausible.
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We are left with the first and second replies. The second is less plausible. If it is
right, we have to explain away Alan's seeming to imagine that a base killing is
permissible as Alan's bearing some mental state other than imagining towards that
proposition. Which? And how did bright, alert Alan confuse it with imagining? The
problem here is that the mental state has to be enough like imagining so that bright, alert
Alan plausibly confuses it with imagining but different enough from imagining so that it
does not entail possibility.
We are left with the first reply. According to it, Alan is imagining that a base
killing is permissible but not, say, clearly and distinctly imagining that. Only clear and
distinct imagining entails possibility. (Maybe only clear and distinct imagining is even a
guide to possibility. I doubt this second claim. We do take imagining the content of
novels to be a guide to possibility-when you read novels, you sometimes learn how
things could be-and the sort of imagining Alan engages in is precisely the sort that
imagining the content of novels involves.)
What I don't like about this reply is that I don't see why Alan's imagining need be
any less clear and distinct than my imagining that a baseless killing is impermissible.
The difference between us is just that Alan has false beliefs about baseless killing. Why
should that impact the clarity and distinctness of his imagination? Prima facie, then,
Alan's moral imagination shows that imaginability does not entail possibility.
Say that the appearance is veridical: imaginability does not entail possibility.
This leads to a general issue. Some impossibilities are imaginable, some aren't. What is
the difference? The essential proposal provides an answer.
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